Engineering Ethics: The Challenger Disaster and the Story of “The Five Lepers” (Ohio Timed & Monitored)

In Engineering Ethics: The Challenger Disaster and the Story of “The Five Lepers” , you'll learn ...

• What caused the Challenger space shuttle to disintegrate shortly after launch in January, 1986
• Why the engineer in charge of the shuttle solid rocket booster project refused to sign off on the launch
• Warning signs from previous flights that went unheeded by senior management
• How the unrelenting pressure to meet the demands of an accelerated flight schedule impacted the launch decision

Overview

To meet the Ohio Board's intent that online courses be "paced" by the provider, a timer will be used to record your study time. You will be unable to access the quiz until the required study time of 50 minutes has been met.

Credit: 1 PDH

Length: 20 pages

The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster occurred on January 28, 1986, when Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, leading to the deaths of its seven crew members.

The disaster resulted in a 32-month hiatus in the shuttle program and the formation of the Rogers Commission, a special commission appointed by U.S. President Ronald Reagan to investigate the accident.

The Rogers Commission found NASA's organizational culture and decision-making processes had been key contributing factors to the accident. NASA managers had known contractor Morton Thiokol's design of the SRBs contained a potentially catastrophic flaw in the O-rings since 1977, but failed to address it properly.

Allan McDonald, director of Morton Thiokol's shuttle solid rocket booster (SRB) project, was at Kennedy Space Center for the launch. He and other engineers worried that cold weather would compromise the O-rings.

In the end, MacDonald was so concerned about the potential for a catastrophic O-ring failure and the resulting loss of life that he refused to sign off on the launch. His boss, also an engineer, was concerned as well… but eventually gave his approval to proceed.

In this course, we’ll review the events surrounding the Challenger Disaster. We’ll also examine the ways in which some engineers adhered to their ethical responsibilities, as outlined in the NSPE Code of Ethics, while others compromised safety because of cost and schedule pressures.

Learning Objectives

Upon completion of this course, participants will be able to:

• Identify the cause of the worst accident in the history of the U.S. space program.
• Explain why there was significant pressure to launch the mission on schedule.
• Describe NASA's basis for selecting Morton Thiokol to build the solid rocket boosters (SRBs) for the Space Shuttle program.
• Analyze why the issue that ultimately doomed Challenger was not corrected despite evidence from tests and flights beginning in 1977.
• Explain why management did not heed a Thiokol engineer's warning about the possibility of a catastrophic loss of human life.
• Evaluate why the decision to launch Challenger in January 1986 was flawed.
• Describe how weather directly contributed to the disaster.
• Summarize what happened to the five engineers who raised their concerns with senior management and NASA.
• Interpret the ethical implications of the Thiokol general manager's statement that managers should take off their engineering hats and put on their management hats.
• Apply the principles of engineering ethics to the Challenger case.

Certificate of Completion

You will be able to immediately print a certificate of completion after passing a multiple-choice quiz consisting of 10 questions. PDH credits are not awarded until the course is completed and quiz is passed.