Gerard VanOoteghem |
Very well written, with great relevance to engineering situations outside of only "submarines".
Michael Sullivan |
Ballast tank calculation question was a bit out of scope.
Jerry Mercer |
Interesting subject. Makes one think about problem associated with reuse of existing designs with new technology.
Eric Minor |
This course was very informative and identified valuable lessons learned that are applicable for any engineer.
Richard Beeler |
Informative, challenging, and interesting.
Waleed Sayed |
Very informative. I knew some of the story, but not the technical details. I do note that the add-on document to this course had information directly applicable to F-1003, the into course, and should have been provided to that course also.
Ted Frison |
Overall this is a good review of the disaster. I was a nuclear-propulsion engineer on the (SUBSAFE) submarine programs in the 1970s and later did forensic marine engineering for the government. I also knew, and dealt professionally with, the Navy Captain who did the initial, on-site, wreck surveys and was on the review boards. My view of the course is that too much weight is given to Bruce Rule's conclusions. The range from the site of the sinking to the SOSUS arrays of the time was significant and low-amplitude events (like water spray or even major flooding with the hull) may not have propagated. While I was not an operator, I was deeply immersed in the SUBSAFE program as it related to main propulsion. My opinion is that during a dive to test depth, the boat would not have been overly negatively buoyant. A minor point given the totality of the accident chain, but a subjective comment on Bruce's theory.
To wit, the suspected silver-brazed fitting that failed was in the maneuvering room aft of the reactor, close to the reactor control panel (actually, it was referred to as the "reactor-control switching panel"). A fine-mist spray probably short-circuited the control panel (that did not have a protective cover), causing the SCRAM. When (if) the joint catastrophically failed, the noise would not have been heard (most likely) in the control room (where the underwater telephone was located (I think) as it was forward of the reactor spaces (i.e. two water tight bulkheads away). Hence the flooding would not have been heard on the underwater telephone.
Finally, purely as conjecture, I was onboard the Scorpion during dockside trials. A high-pressure hydraulic pipe failed. The entire engine room immediately misted over and visibility dropped to about one foot. I have to wonder if the Thresher crew in the area of the failure would have been able to see, and operate, the system controls under the circumstances (even if the main-steam and throttle valves were to be opened to use the reserve heat).
Dean Hannam |
This example demonstrates many important issues related to failure investigation of complex engineering systems.
